over two dozen investigations into parents. One of those parents was investigated simply because they owned a firearm. That is the context and why we have concerns with this legislation.

I hope we vote "no" on this. More importantly, I hope the Senate doesn't pass this package they are talking about, which would certainly undermine liberties of law-abiding American citizens.

Madam Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. CICILLINE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time to close.

Mr. Speaker, if I were a classroom teacher right now, I would say to the gentleman from Ohio: Focus. Focus. Pay attention to what we are talking about.

What we are talking about is an active shooter alert. We are not talking about a red flag bill. We are not talking about any effort to undermine the Second Amendment. We are not talking about education policy. We are talking about one thing: Can we help keep people safe?

This is not redundant because while it is being used by 1,400 cities and towns around the country, there are thousands and thousands who have not used it because they can't access it because they don't have the resources, the protocols, the best practices. This will allow them.

If we save one life, if because of the active shooter alert we save one child, one police officer, it will have been worth it.

I urge my colleagues to vote "yes" on H.R. 6538. Give our brave law enforcement men and women who keep our communities safe every tool they need to keep themselves safe and keep the communities they serve safe. Don't take my word for it; take theirs. They have all endorsed it. They are asking for a "yes."

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 6538, the "Active Shooter Alert Act of 2022."

In recent weeks, months, and years, we have mourned the loss of life resulting from an ever-increasing number of active shooter incidents where perpetrators committed mass shootings in multiple locations.

Communities in every corner of this country have been subjected to the fear and uncertainty created by active shooters in their midst.

Last year, there were 61 active shooter incidents in the United States. Approximately 27 of those incidents involved an active shooter moving from one location to another.

For instance, 8 people were killed roughly 30 miles apart at three spas in the metro Atlanta area last year. The gunman was later apprehended some 150 miles south of Atlanta.

And we are all still reeling from the gruesome murder of 19 fourth graders and two teachers in Uvalde, Texas that began when the perpetrator shot his grandmother in the home they shared.

He then drove away, crashing his vehicle outside Robb Elementary. He encountered several people before entering the school and committing unspeakable acts on those helpless children and teachers.

While the actions of these individuals and other active shooters are unacceptable and require Congress to enact measures to put an end to such evil acts, we must also be prepared if these situations occur, and do all we can to help law enforcement save more lives.

Law enforcement's response to an active shooter is a dynamic situation—oftentimes chaotic—that involves many variables, requires swift, consequential decision-making, and places great strain on law enforcement command staff and their officers on the ground.

Their goal is to save the lives of victims and prevent others from unknowingly entering the area or walking into the line of fire—at all times focusing on containing, neutralizing, and apprehending the shooter.

Centers of higher learning and primary education, businesses, local jurisdictions, and law enforcement agencies have already implemented some systems to alert students, employees, patrons, and community members of the presence of an active shooter, and to help manage the response, and provide updates about the ongoing crisis via text message and/or social media.

Many of these systems face low enrollment and messaging delays that sometimes contribute to confusion around the incident. In the case of social media—insufficient account visibility means fewer people are made aware of an existing threat to their safety.

Recently here in Washington, D.C. a sniperstyle attacker set a rifle on a tripod and fired randomly at passersby walking below his window.

D.C. Metro Police used their Twitter account to warn people to avoid the area and shelter in place. But the tweets, or posts, received minimal attention during the actual attack.

An Active Shooter Alert might have saved the life of the woman who unknowingly walked directly into the line of fire of the Buffalo shooter in the Tops parking lot.

Law enforcement needs a reliable method of communication to rapidly notify as many people as possible within the vicinity of an ongoing active shooter incident; provide instructions to avoid the area or shelter in place; and announce when the area has been restored to safety.

H.Ä. 6538, the Active Shooter Alert Act of 2022, would authorize the Department of Justice to coordinate the creation of an Active Shooter Alert Network, enabling law enforcement to send active shooter alerts within their communities using the same system that issues AMBER Alerts, severe storm and extreme weather events warnings, and other emergency situations.

That system—the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System can send alerts to mobile devices in locally targeted areas down to 1/10th of a mile.

This legislation would ensure that an advisory panel—comprised of law enforcement officers, public safety experts, and emergency response officials experienced in responding to active shooter situations—has input in the development of best practices for issuing alerts effectively.

DOJ by way of an appointed Active Shooter Alert Coordinator would be responsible for establishing the advisory panel; establishing and promoting adoption of the best practices; and coordinating with FEMA, the Department of Transportation, and the FCC on using the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System to issue alerts for the network and to provide a report to Congress on the effectiveness of the network

Although this system would be available to law enforcement agencies to use on a voluntary basis, I expect that many agencies would elect to participate based on the numerous endorsements previously mentioned by the Chairman.

I thank ACAL Subcommittee Chairman CICILLINE for his leadership on this lifesaving, bipartisan legislation that I am proud to cosponsor along with Representatives DEUTCH, SPARTZ, UPTON, THOMPSON, MEIJER, and MACE.

I ask my colleagues to support this bill.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. MRVAN). The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. CICILLINE) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 6538, as amended.

The question was taken.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.

Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and navs.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to section 3(s) of House Resolution 8, the yeas and nays are ordered.

Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on this motion are postponed.

□ 1600

PROMOTING UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL LEADERSHIP IN 5G ACT OF 2021

Ms. MANNING. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 1934) to direct the Federal Government to provide assistance and technical expertise to enhance the representation and leadership of the United States at international standards-setting bodies that set standards for equipment, systems, software, and virtually defined networks that support 5th and future generations mobile telecommunications systems and infrastructure, and for other purposes, as amended.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The text of the bill is as follows:

H.R. 1934

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Promoting United States International Leadership in 5G Act of 2021".

SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that-

(1) the United States and its allies and partners should maintain participation and leadership at international standards-setting bodies for 5th and future generations mobile telecommunications systems and infrastructure:

(2) the United States should work with its allies and partners to encourage and facilitate the development of secure supply chains

and networks for 5th and future generations mobile telecommunications systems and infrastructure; and

(3) the maintenance of a high standard of security in telecommunications and cyberspace between the United States and its allies and partners is a national security interest of the United States.

SEC. 3. ENHANCING REPRESENTATION AND LEADERSHIP OF THE UNITED STATES AT INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS-SETTING BODIES.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall establish an interagency working group to work with allies and international partners to increase and align their engagement at multilateral international organizations, such as the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), that address communications networks, standards, and security, including 5th and future generations mobile telecommunications and infrastructure.

(b) INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP.—The interagency working group described in subsection (a) shall—

(1) be chaired by the Secretary of State or a designee of the Secretary of State; and

(2) consist of the head (or designee) of the Department of Commerce and each Federal department or agency the President determines appropriate.

(c) Function.—The Secretary of State shall coordinate with the members of the interagency working group to develop and implement a strategy for diplomatic engagement with allies and partners and monitor engagement by the Government of the People's Republic of China and entities under its ownership, control, or influence at multilateral international organizations described in subsection (a).

(d) BRIEFING.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the interagency working group shall provide to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate a briefing that includes—

(1) a strategy for diplomatic engagement with allies and partners to share security risk information and findings pertaining to equipment that supports or is used in 5th and future generations mobile telecommunications systems and infrastructure and cooperation on mitigating such risks; and

(2) a discussion of China's presence and activities at multilateral international organizations described in subsection (a) relevant to 5th and future generation mobile telecommunications systems and infrastructure, including information on the differences in the scope and scale of China's engagement, as well as the success rate of proposals by Chinese entities adopted into standards at such organizations compared to the engagement and success rate of proposals adopted by the United States or its allies and partners, and noting any mandatory domestic Chinese standards that are adopted at such organizations.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentlewoman from North Carolina (Ms. Manning) and the gentlewoman from California (Mrs. Kim) each will control 20 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from North Carolina.

GENERAL LEAVE

Ms. MANNING. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on H.R. 1934, as amended.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from North Carolina?

There was no objection.

Ms. MANNING. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 1934, the Promoting United States International Leadership in 5G Act.

Let me start by thanking Ranking Member McCaul, who has been an important advocate in advancing U.S. leadership in global telecoms and 5G technology. Countering China's and Russia's malign influence in this industry is critical for protecting our national security, and I thank him for his bipartisan work in furtherance of these ends.

A big part of advancing U.S. 5G leadership is ensuring that America and allied countries are in the room, at the table, and leading the charge to set next-generation technology standards.

No organization is more critical to that process than a little-known U.N. organization called the International Telecommunication Union, or ITU.

For years, China and Russia have quietly targeted the ITU as a central battleground to advance their strategic technology interests. They have sought to use the ITU to unfairly advantage their telecom companies, giving Putin and the PRC power over critical communications infrastructure worldwide.

For the past 8 years, a Chinese national has served as Secretary General of the ITU. China has used this perch to favor its own companies and make the rules of the digital road more favorable to authoritarians. The Secretary General has defended Huawei against critics and promoted the PRC's Belt and Road campaign. With the ITU as its forum, Beijing has worked to unfairly promote Chinese companies' technical standards.

Now, a pivotal election for the next ITU Secretary General is set to take place in September between a fantastic American candidate, Doreen Bogdan-Martin, and former Huawei executive and Russian deputy telecom minister, Rashid Ismailov, whom China and Russia back.

Should the United States and its allies across the world fail to win this election, the ITU's technical integrity would be endangered and authoritarian governments around the globe would be empowered. A Russian Secretary General would extend Putin's ability to exert influence in the rules-based international system for which he has shown the utmost contempt.

This bill is important because the U.S. must increase its engagement at the ITU and work with our allies and partners to counter China's and Russia's malign influence. H.R. 1934 would do just that, by forming an interagency working group to align our strategy at the ITU with our allies and monitor China's influence in the organization. It would also strengthen much-needed coordination with Congress so we can

be supportive partners in this strategic competition.

We cannot be complacent about the coming election. The battle for influence playing out at the ITU is one we cannot afford to lose, and H.R. 1934 is an essential tool for advancing U.S. leadership in this powerful organization.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this effort by voting for this legislation today, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mrs. KIM of California. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this important bipartisan legislation, the Promoting United States International Leadership in 5G Act.

Mr. Speaker, the Chinese Communist Party does not hide the fact that they will do whatever it takes to become the prominent global power, especially by taking control of the world's 5G networks. The CCP's espionage tactics, theft of U.S. intellectual property, and cyber hacking threaten our national security and our competitiveness in the international community. Allowing the CCP to establish the global standards for 5G and push countries to adopt 5G technology from CCP-linked companies like Huawei will only increase the amount of control and influence that the CCP has globally.

This bill provides increased cooperation between the United States and our allies to identify and counter security risks posed by Chinese Communist Party-linked companies in 5G. In addition, the bill requires the State Department to develop a diplomatic strategy to increase engagement with partners at the international standards setting bodies, such as the International Telecommunications Union, ITU, which sets global standards for technologies such as 5G.

There is an important upcoming election at the ITU which will decide the future of global telecommunications for years to come. It is imperative that we pass this bill today so that the United States and our allies can put up a united front against a Russian- and CCP-aligned candidate for Secretary General of the ITU. Russia's campaign to elect a Russian national, who is a former Huawei executive, to serve as the secretary general of the ITU is indicative of Russia's and China's efforts to use the international organization to promote their interests and malign influence.

The United States should ensure that we are coordinated in driving support for the United States candidate, Doreen Bogdan-Martin, for the Secretary General of the ITU, but the State Department should also be engaging on the important down-ballot races at the ITU.

There are four other posts of significance within the ITU's leadership structure, including the director of the ITU Development Sector, ITU-D. The ITU-D plays a particularly vital role in

supporting multilateral cooperation for fair and open internet governance through trustworthy deployment of digital technologies in the developing world. The United States must be doing everything we can to ensure Russian and Chinese malign influence does not grow. This bill will help.

Mr. Speaker, in closing, I thank Ranking Member MIKE MCCAUL and Representative CUELLAR for their work on this legislation. This bill will help ensure that the United States is doing all we can to stop Russian and Chinese malign influence taking control of the world's 5G networks.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this bill, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Ms. MANNING. Madam Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentlewoman from North Carolina (Ms. Manning) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 1934, as amended.

The question was taken.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.

Mr. CLOUD. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to section 3(s) of House Resolution 8, the yeas and nays are ordered.

Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further proceedings on this motion are postponed.

CONDEMNING THE OCTOBER 25, 2021, MILITARY COUP IN SUDAN AND STANDING WITH THE PEO-PLE OF SUDAN

Ms. MANNING. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and agree to the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 59) condemning the October 25, 2021, military coup in Sudan and standing with the people of Sudan.

The Clerk read the title of the concurrent resolution.

The text of the concurrent resolution is as follows:

H. Con. Res. 59

Whereas the people of the Republic of Sudan suffered for three decades under the despotic rule of President Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, whose government was responsible for the suppression of civil liberties, grand corruption, support for international terrorism, and the commission of crimes against humanity and genocide;

Whereas, throughout 2019, a coalition of Sudanese civic groups, including professional associations, labor unions, community groups, democracy activists, and opposition parties, led a mass protest movement to demand the end of Bashir's reign and the transition to democracy in Sudan;

Whereas, on April 11, 2019, Sudanese military officers deposed Bashir, and, following continued protests, agreed to form a transitional government in partnership with a civilian pro-democracy coalition on July 17, 2019:

Whereas, on June 3, 2019, Sudanese forces led by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), largely comprised of Janjaweed militia in-

volved in genocidal campaigns across Darfur for decades, opened fire on protesters at an army command headquarters in Khartoum, killing at least 127 people, at least 40 of whom were found in the Nile River;

Whereas the military and civilian elements agreed to a 39-month transition to democracy, with a Civilian-Led Transitional Government (CLTG) comprised of a predominantly civilian cabinet led by Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok, a Sovereign Council, an executive body with civilian and military members chaired for the first half of the transitional period by Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and a Transitional Legislative Council, which has yet to be formed:

Whereas the United States and the international community supported Sudan's transition to democracy, with the United States identifying more than \$1,000,000,000 in foreign assistance, and the multilateral Friends of Sudan group pledging \$1,800,000,000 from roughly 50 countries and international organizations:

Whereas the CLTG made progress in human rights reforms, including guaranteeing the people of Sudan freedom of religion and gender equality under the transitional constitution, banning female genital mutilation, and decriminalizing apostasy:

Whereas, in August 2021, when the Sudanese Cabinet ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the CLTG made progress towards ending impunity for abusers of human rights, stating its intention to deliver Omar al-Bashir to the ICC to stand trial for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, and formed civilian committees to investigate corruption and crimes against humanity perpetrated by the Bashir regime;

Whereas the transitional government negotiated a peace agreement with several rebel groups, a step towards ending decades of conflict in the regions of Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile, which killed hundreds of thousands of civilians and left more than 3.000.000 people displaced within Sudan:

Whereas Sudan continues to face a serious humanitarian situation, with an estimated 13,400,000 people, or 29 percent of the population, in need of humanitarian assistance in 2021.

Whereas Sudan faces a severe economic crisis, exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, which caused the price of food and consumer goods to increase significantly, while austerity measures imposed to stabilize the economy resulted in the reduction or elimination of subsidies for commodities including wheat and fuel:

Whereas the political tensions between the civilian and military elements and within factions of the civilian coalition undermined the CLTG and contributed to widespread unrest within the Sudanese population relating to a range of issues, including the economic crisis, ethnic and tribal conflict in peripheral regions, and the unsatisfactory pace of reforms:

Whereas, on September 21, 2021, some members of the military reportedly attempted a coup d'état against the transitional government, which failed to depose the government but succeeded in precipitating the most serious political crisis of the transition period;

Whereas, on October 21, 2021, hundreds of thousands of people across Sudan demonstrated in support of democratic civilian rule, to counter a smaller protest days prior demanding the military take complete control of the government;

Whereas, on October 25, 2021, Lieutenant General Burhan, with the support of General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as "Hemedti", seized control of the government, deployed the military to the streets of

Khartoum and Omdurman, and arrested and detained Prime Minister Hamdok and other civilian officials;

Whereas the African Union Peace and Security Council convened on October 27, 2021, strongly condemned the coup, reaffirmed the mandate of the CLTG, and subsequently suspended Sudan from the regional body "with immediate effect . . . until the effective restoration" of the CLTG;

Whereas the actions of Lieutenant General Burhan and the Sudanese military violate Sudan's Constitutional Charter and threaten to plunge Sudan into isolation and instability;

Whereas the United States Government publicly condemned the coup, suspended its foreign assistance to Sudan, and urged Lieutenant General Burhan and his accomplices to restore the CLTG and return Sudan to the path to democracy; and

Whereas, the Troika (the United States, United Kingdom, Norway), the European Union, and Switzerland "continue to recognize the Prime Minister and his cabinet as the constitutional leaders of the transitional government" and "confirm once again the international calls for the immediate return to the roadmap for democratic transition of Sudan": Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That Congress—

- (1) condemns the October 25, 2021, coup in Sudan;
- (2) stands with the people of Sudan in their democratic aspirations;
- (3) recognizes the Prime Minister and his cabinet as the constitutional leaders of Sudan's transitional government;
 - (4) calls for Sudan's military junta to-
- (A) immediately release all civilian government officials, civil society members, and other individuals detained in connection with the coup;
- (B) return to constitutional rule under the transitional constitution as the starting point for negotiations with civilians toward full civilian rule;
- (C) lift the state of emergency, including complete restoration of all means of communication;
- (D) remove all roadblocks and checkpoints, and order the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and RSF to stand down and comply with international recognized rules of engagement:
- (E) ensure security forces respect the right to peaceful protest and hold those who used excessive force and committed other abuses accountable in a transparent, credible process:
- (F) cease all attempts to change the civilian composition of the cabinet, Sovereign Council, and other government bodies; and
- (G) transfer leadership of the Sovereign Council to a civilian member of the Sovereign Council in keeping with the transitional constitution:
- (5) calls on the Secretary of State to—
- (A) immediately identify coup leaders, their accomplices, and enablers for consideration for targeted sanctions;
- (B) urge junta leaders to return immediately to the rule of law as set forth by the transitional constitution;
- (C) monitor, discourage, and deter any effort by external parties to support the coup and the military junta;
 - (D) coordinate with—
- (i) the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development and other Federal Government agencies to pause all non-humanitarian bilateral assistance to Sudan until restoration of the transitional constitutional order;
- (ii) the Department of the Treasury to use the voice and vote of the United States in